* 'A lesson we need to learn is if you start losing the gains of war at the negotiating table, they become a disincentive for future wars,' says Lieutenant General D B Shekatkar (retd), reviewing the lessons from the 1965 War. *From India’s perspective, the Kashmir problem remained unresolved; Pakistan eventually launched an unrelenting proxy war which has lasted 45 years and continues to this day. *Thousands lost their lives. The blood never dried; the tears have never stopped flowing.
Opinion
01/03/2019
1712.
Sub :
* 'A lesson we need to learn is if you start losing the gains of war at the negotiating table, they become a disincentive for future wars,' says Lieutenant General D B Shekatkar (retd), reviewing the lessons from the 1965 War.
*From India’s perspective, the Kashmir problem remained unresolved; Pakistan eventually launched an unrelenting proxy war which has lasted 45 years and continues to this day.
*Thousands lost their lives. The blood never dried; the tears have never stopped flowing.
Ref : Why did India give back the Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan? : September 23, 2015 : Archana Masih/Rediff
'We don't know what the reasons were that we gave back the Haji Pir Pass which was strategically very important. Today the entire infiltration into Kashmir takes place from that area. If we had retained that post that we had captured, things could have been different.''A lesson we need to learn is if you start losing the gains of war at the negotiating table, they become a disincentive for future wars,' says Lieutenant General D B Shekatkar (retd), reviewing the lessons from the 1965 War.
I was a captain doing a mountain warfare course in Gulmarg. Our course was stopped midway and we were ordered to hunt for the infiltrators Pakistan had sent into Kashmir in 1965 to create a revolt-like situation in the valley and then annex it. But Pakistan did not succeed.
Thereafter, Pakistan attacked Chhamb. The aim was to capture Akhnoor and cut Jammu off from the rest of India. That did not work out either.
Had the attack on Akhnoor succeeded, India could have been in serious trouble. There would have been a threat to Kashmir and to Jammu. We could have lost it forever.
*When Pakistan attacked Chhamb, India had no option but to retaliate.
*We launched a two pronged thrust. One, in Sialkot from the Jammu-Pathankot side, where the Indian Army with the support of tanks reached the outskirts of Sialkot.
*The second thrust was south of Lahore. The aim was not to enter Lahore, but go south of Lahore.
*This was the largest tank battle after the Second World War. That battle went on for 5, 7 days with almost 400 tanks on either side.
*The Indian Army entered south of Ferozepur into Pakistan. So the war was confined to the Chenab, Jammu Tawi, Ravi and Sutlej rivers.
*These were the corridors available because when you capture territory you have to see where your ingress can be faster and how quickly can the objective given to you be achieved.
*The aim was to threaten Lahore, not capture it. Fighting in built up areas -- cities, towns -- is a difficult proposition.
*There was a new government in India at that time. Pandit Nehru had died and Lal Bahadur Shastri was the new PM.
Even the government in Pakistan was new. Ayub Khan was the dictator, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was foreign minister and General Musa was the commander-in-chief.
Just two-and-a-half years earlier, India had been defeated by the Chinese. Pakistan was better equipped because they were getting weapons from America. There were reports of an understanding between China and Pakistan. Luckily, America did not intervene the way Pakistan had anticipated.
Since India was recovering from the shock of the 1962 defeat, Pakistan thought there would not be a better opportunity to take on India.
We were not the same army in 1965 as we were in 1971. The Indian Army was not well equipped in 1965 and was trying to rebuild itself up with Soviet help.
The people of India were also recovering from the reverses of the 1962 war.
When you launch a war, all these factors have to be taken into account.
The army was given a free hand by then defence minister Y B Chavan. Credit should also go to the then leadership of the Indian Army.
All these factors combined together created an impact on the outcome of the war.
Wars are not fought in isolation. Wars are first conceived in the mind. Only its manifestation is on the ground.
Bhutto had convinced Ayub Khan about the Pakistan army's success against India. As an army man himself, Ayub Khan had some doubts, but capturing Akhnoor was his idea.
When you go to war you should be reasonably sure that you will win.
Secondly, you should be sure how long you are going to prolong the war.
Thirdly, what is the duration during which you are going to achieve your aim.
There is also the factor of national endurance because when you fight a war, the nation cannot come to a grinding halt. Hospitals, offices etc have to run, human beings have to survive. If sanctions are imposed, you need to know how long you can survive.
India was able to capture a reasonable area of Pakistan -- the grain producing area -- in the 1965 War. Any deeper thrust would have affected Pakistan.
Ayub Khan realised that Pakistan was not going to win the war and India if not checked was in a position to capture Lahore.
*The Indian Army had captured the Haji Pir Pass which overlooks Pakistan occupied Kashmir, but as a result of the negotiations in Tashkent the following January between India and Pakistan, for some reason, we did not insist on Pakistan vacating Chhamb.
*As a result, even today Chhamb is with Pakistan.
We don't know what the reasons were that we gave back the Haji Pir Pass which was strategically very important. Today the entire infiltration into Kashmir takes place from that area.
If we had retained that post that we had captured, things could have been different.
*Haji Pir was given to Pakistan because of the Indian government's magnanimity! ( #FOOLISH DECISION OF THEN GOVERNMENT)
A lesson we need to learn is if you start losing the gains of war at the negotiating table, they become a disincentive for future wars.
You can never ever gain anything on the political table what you lose on the battleground.
Your occupation on the ground has to be very firm so that the enemy knows that you are not going to give up. If you are not sure of your aims and objectives, you shouldn't go to war.
The Indian Army was in a very strong position when the 1965 War was called off.
Pakistan claimed that the Indian Army did not succeed in capturing Lahore, but that was not our intention. After all, the army functions within the framework laid down by the government.
The 1965 War had a very big impact on the psyche of the Indian people and the Indian nation. That we could defeat Pakistan, the same Pakistan that created problems in Kashmir in 1947.
The same Pakistan that hoped a defeated India of the 1962 war could be defeated.
*After 1965, the desire for independence started building up in East Pakistan.
It was the beginning of the revolution in the minds of the people of East Pakistan. Six years later Bangladesh came into being.
*After six years, India had become so powerful that we could break Pakistan into two parts.
*I don't say any war is useful, but the 1965 War achieved four things:
*1. Rebuilding of confidence among the people and the armed forces.
*2. Realisation in the political leadership about the development of our defence mechanism for India's security.
*3. The beginning of the downfall of Pakistan's rule in East Pakistan. Had we not succeeded in defeating Pakistan in 1965, the desire for seeking independence in East Pakistan may not have formed.
*4. Pakistan got a rude shock that India was not what they thought it was.
In his own wisdom Ayub Khan had told his senior commanders that they should bypass Amritsar and go east of Amritsar -- that means Pakistan would have captured Amritsar if they had wanted. In fact, Ayub Khan boasted that the Pakistan flag must fly over Delhi. That was the level of confidence -- that they had dreams to see the Pakistani flag flying over the Red Fort.
In the 1971 war we had to go with our tanks in the same area in Punjab to prevent any territorial loss while the war was going on in Bangladesh.
We made the Lahore airport unusable, that was the kind of our hold of the area. If the government had given orders to go deep -- because there was no threat at that time of a nuclear bomb -- maybe we could have captured more territory that would have enabled us to have greater bargaining power.
What's the point of war if you can't dictate your terms to the opponent to agree to what you want in your national interest?
Exactly, after 25 years, Pakistan launched a similar attack in Kargil. They sent people (soldiers) in civilian clothes and occupied our areas.
Pervez Musharraf, who was the commander-in-chief, said they were not their people, they were freedom fighters.
The Pakistan army is the only army in the world which refused to accept the bodies of its soldiers.
Pakistani infiltrators captured in the Kashmir valley in 1965.
The hidden war, the war in the garb of civilians, has become the philosophy of Pakistan.
Therefore, we have to be very careful in the future because history has a chronic habit of repeating itself if you don't learn from it. It has a habit of punishing you if you don't learn.
*The Indian political leadership and governing mechanism must know one thing clearly -- when your enemy is not in a position to fight a prolonged war, bash him! hit him hard!
In a war, after a particular period of time, the superpowers with veto powers in the UN Security Council start discussing sanctions, blockades etc. So for a country to achieve its strategic aims, it doesn't have the luxury of prolonging a war.
We had captured the grain producing region of Pakistan in 1965. Had we retained it for two or three years after the war ended, it would have put tremendous pressure on Pakistan.
In any war, your national aim and your political objective must be clear.
There is a philosophy of warfare which says if you know your adversary and if you can deter him, then you can live in peace for 100 years.
Secondly, it is not the severity of punishment, but the certainty of punishment that deters your enemy.
These are factors that inhibit your enemy. Unfortunately as a nation we have not been able to do that.
If Pakistan does not learn its lesson, it must be prepared to lose even more territory. I am 100% sure there will be another Bangladesh in Pakistan.
It may take 10, 15 years, but people are preparing themselves.
Pakistan is playing with fire. They are heading towards the destruction of their own people.
It was the incapability of the Pakistan army to control East Pakistan, the distance and rising expectations that provoked the people there to seek independence.
*If they don't learn now, can they prevent a repetition in some other part of Pakistan?
From 1947, we have been fighting wars. We had the 1948 War, the 1962 War, the 1965 War, the 1971 War, the Nagaland insurgency, which was the longest insurgency in the world, terrorism in Kashmir, terrorism in Punjab... those who are born here and are going to die here spout anti-India sentiments.
*Doesn't it show that something is wrong with us somewhere and our internal security?
Of course, the Indian Army has not allowed any territory to cede from India, neither will it ever allow it. There is no power on earth which can take away even an inch of Indian territory with the power of the gun. Our armed forces and the nation will not allow it.Secession is a state of mind. Whenever you are weak internally, your adversary will make use of it and that is what 1965 did. Ayub Khan realised that we were weak from within.
The 1965 War should not be read only as history and forgotten. There are big lessons in it for us and those lessons are perennial.
Lieutenant General Dr D B Shekatkar (retd), PVSM, AVSM, AVSM, fought in the 1965 War in Kashmir, the 1971 War in the Western Theatre. He also trained the Mukti Bahini before the war of liberation.
During the Kargil War the general was in charge of the entire China front in Arunachal Pradesh.The general, who served extensively in the North East, compelled a record number (1,267) of terrorists in Kashmir, trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan to give up terrorism.
General Shekatkar spoke to Archana Masih/Rediff
***
Ref : 2. The Untold Story of India's Decision to Release 93,000 Pakistani POWs After 1971 War
Indira Gandhi's biggest worry after the surrender of Pakistan in 1971 was the safety of Mujibur Rahman. The release of Pakistani POWs was the price Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (and the ISI) extracted for the safe return of the Bangladeshi leader.
On August 2, 1972 – eight months after the 13-day India-Pakistan war ended on December 16, 1971 – the two countries signed the Shimla Agreement under which India agreed to release all the 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POW) its army had taken during the course of the war. This proved to be a controversial decision, with many in India questioning why Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had squandered a golden opportunity to bargain with Pakistan and settle the Kashmir problem on India’s terms.
What motivated Mrs Gandhi to release the POWs? What went on behind the scenes? Were there any compelling circumstances at play that have remained unreported? If there were any, ideally they should be brought into the public domain, so that future generations may benefit from the lessons of history. Since I was personally privy to these developments, as a retired diplomat I can now tell the story, even if it has been 40 years since these events transpired.
December 16, 1971 – the day when Pakistan’s armed forces laid down their arms at a surrender ceremony in Dhaka before the joint command of the Indian armed forces and Bangladesh’s Mukti Bahini – was the finest hour in both India and Bangladesh’s military histories, one old and another new.
However as the two armed forces were celebrating their military victory against an unrelenting tormentor, Mrs Gandhi was pondering the other critical issues facing India.
Apart from dealing with the enormous cost of the war, India also had to bear the financial burden of looking after the 10 million refugees who had crossed over to India from East Pakistan as they fled the Pakistani army’s horrendous atrocities, better known as the Bangladesh Genocide of 1971.
The other big challenge, which was quite complex diplomatically since it involved national security and foreign policy issues, in addition to requiring delicate handling, was the unforeseen and un-budgeted responsibility of having to look after the 93,000 Pakistani soldiers taken as POWs. India wanted to keep the Pakistani soldiers in conditions of comfort that went over and above the provisions listed in the Geneva Convention.
Indira Gandhi’s paramount concern at that moment of time was figuring out how to get Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman back to his country alive and well.
She was prepared to pay any price to save his life. This much the prime minister confided to at least one member of her so called ‘kitchen Cabinet’. That person was Ram Nath Kao. the RAW chief.
She was acutely aware of the fact that Mujib was tried by a Pakistani military court and a verdict of death by hanging on charges of treason had been handed down to the Bangladesh leader. Also, as is typical with the Pakistani military, its security services did not fail to demonstrate their morbidity in the crudest possible terms. In his prison cell, a 6.5 ft long grave was dug with a rope with a loop at the end hanging over it – serving as a warning that he could face a cruel death any moment.
It would be a nightmare for Gandhi if the Pakistan army carried out the death sentence and left Bangladesh an orphaned state. For India, which supported the Bangladesh liberation struggle with its heart and soul, his execution would be an unmitigated disaster, a dream shattered. So it was in India’s interests to leave no stone unturned to save Mujib’s life, for his sake, for the sake of his family, for the sake of Bangladesh and for its own sake.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s defeat at the hands of its perceived arch enemy India was seen as an intolerable insult to its nationhood. To make matters worse, Pakistan lost half of its territory to Bangladesh, leaving Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s two-nation theory – the ideological foundation of Pakistan’s existence – in tatters. Stung by this catastrophe, the military dictator, General Yahya Khan, in a flash decision, took full responsibility for the national disaster and stepped down from office. He asked Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was still in New York attending UN Security Council meetings, to return home. Bhutto was also informed by General Yahya Khan that he had resigned from his office and that he (Bhutto) had been appointed as the chief martial law administrator of Pakistan. However, before he took his flight for Rawalpindi, Bhutto was instructed to call on US President Richard Nixon, Pakistan’s mentor at that time, in Washington DC.
The grand finale – an unlikely thriller :
Bhutto’s Washington-Rawalpindi flight was scheduled for a refuelling stopover at Heathrow airport in London.
Having secured insider information about Bhutto’s journey home, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called an emergency meeting of the war cabinet in New Delhi at her office in South Block. She wanted, with the utmost urgency, to secure a contact who would be present for Bhutto’s arrival at Heathrow, so she could get the only piece of intelligence India was looking for – what did Bhutto think about Mujibur Rahman being sentenced to death by a Pakistan military court?
The meeting was attended by Durga Prasad Dhar, head of policy planning in the Ministry of External Affairs; Ram Nath Kao, chief of RAW; P.N. Haksar, the prime minister’s principal secretary and T.N. Kaul, the foreign secretary.
It was under Mrs Gandhi’s instructions that Muzaffar Hussain – the former chief secretary of the East Pakistan government, the highest ranked civil servant posted in Dhaka as of December 16, 1971 who had subsequently become a POW in India – was lodged as a VIP guest at the official residence of D.P. Dhar. His wife, Laila, who was visiting London when war broke out on December 3, 1971 couldn’t return home and was stuck there. Both husband and wife (in Delhi and London) were communicating with each other through diplomatic channels. I was assigned the job of a VIP courier. Thanks to conducting several back and forths between the two, I soon established a useful rapport with Laila Hussain.
The prime minister was very much aware that Laila and Bhutto had been intimate friends for a long time and continued to be so. It was felt at the PMO that she was well placed to play a key role in a one-off diplomatic “summit” at the VIP lounge, the Alcock and Brown Suite, at Heathrow airport.
I had met Dhar several times in London during the nine months – from 25 March 1971 to 16 December 1971 – that the Bangladeshi liberation struggle was on. It was at that time that we became friends. He was an unassuming, refined literary personality, extremely well-versed in Urdu poetry. My love of Urdu poetry from my days at Osmania University in Hyderabad was what resulted in our unlikely friendship – despite the huge gap in official hierarchy. D.P. was a cabinet minister and I was a mere bureaucrat.
Just two days before Bhutto was to arrive in London I got a telephone call from D.P. in Delhi. He wanted me to inform Laila that Bhutto had been appointed the chief martial law administrator (CMLA) of Pakistan and that he was on his way to Islamabad from Washington. His flight would be stopping at Heathrow airport for refuelling. I was supposed to persuade Laila to meet Bhutto – for old time’s sake – and ask him, in his capacity as the CMLA, if he could help in getting her husband released from Delhi. Laila knew only too well that I was aware that she had had a relationship with Bhutto in the past. Seeing how the discussions progressed would be a matter of great interest to us. India wanted to know only one thing: what Bhutto was thinking about Rahman, whether to release him to return home, or carry out the military court’s verdict of death.
I succeeded in setting up the meeting. The two long-lost friends, Laila and Bhutto, met at the VIP lounge at Heathrow airport. The meeting was marked by great cordiality. It was as convivial as could be. Without a doubt, the back-channel encounter turned out to be a meeting of great historic significance. It was well and truly a thriller, a grand finale to this narrative.
Bhutto was quick on the uptake. As he responded to Laila’s emotional appeal for help in getting her husband released from Indian custody, he also cottoned onto the fact that the lady was in fact doing the Indian government’s bidding.
*With a twinkle in his eye, Bhutto changed the subject. And pulling her aside, he whispered to Laila a very sensitive, top secret message for the Indian prime minister. Sourced from Laila, I quote:
*“Laila, I know what you want. I can imagine you are [carrying a request] from Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Do please pass a message to her, that after I take charge of office back home, I will shortly thereafter release Mujibur Rahman, allowing him to return home. What I want in return, I will let Mrs. Indira Gandhi know through another channel. You may now go.”
*After Laila briefed me following the meeting, I lost no time in shooting out a confidential message to the PMO in Delhi reporting Laila Hussain’s input.
Not unexpectedly, Gandhi was pleased that Bhutto had sent out a positive message, although it was done unofficially through a back channel. However, she remained suspicious of whether Bhutto could be trusted. The prime minister was cautiously optimistic, but only just. Was Bhutto trying to mislead India? Was he creating a false dawn with a mischievous motive? She wanted a confirmation of Laila’s input from our diplomatic mission in Pakistan as fast as possible. Meanwhile, within hours, a report came back from Islamabad confirming the authenticity of Laila’s report. At this point, Gandhi took matters in her own hands, elevating the discourse from the bureaucratic to the political level.
At her own level, Gandhi had come to know that Rahman would first land in London and then fly from there to Dhaka, or maybe via Delhi.
She confided to one of the members of her kitchen cabinet that she now had confirmed information about what Bhutto wanted from her in return for Rahman’s impending release.
Bhutto had no option but to release Rahman first, the POWs would come later. Obviously, Bhutto was relying on Gandhi’s sense of decency to not let him down. It was starting to get clear that Indira Gandhi had made up her mind. If Bhutto personally asked her for the release of the POWs, she would not hesitate in agreeing to it. A gesture of generosity must be met with a matching gesture of grace. Nothing less.
In a show of manufactured geo-political generosity, Bhutto (read: ISI) over-ruled the death sentence handed out by a military court in Rawalpindi and released Mujibur Rahman on January 8, 1972. On his return, Mujib took charge as prime minister of Bangladesh on January 10, 1972.
*Exuding a spirit of genuine gratefulness for sparing the life of Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s father of the nation, eight months after he was set free, India ordered the release of all 93,000 Pakistani POWs under the Shimla Agreement of August 2, 1972. The world had never known such decency in international relations as India’s conduct with Pakistan on the POW issue.
*The brutal assassination of Mujibur Rahman and his family three years and eight months later on August 15, 1975 by a batch of Abbottabad-trained army officers – who were then holding senior positions in the Bangladesh army – seemed like the belated fulfilment of the ISI’s unfinished agenda for Bangladesh. The ISI wanted to mete out severe punishment to the Bangladeshi leader for his role in unravelling Pakistan’s territorial integrity. His release from Mianwali prison on January 8, 1972 was merely a distraction.
*From India’s perspective, the Kashmir problem remained unresolved; Pakistan eventually launched an unrelenting proxy war which has lasted 45 years and continues to this day.
*Thousands lost their lives. The blood never dried; the tears have never stopped flowing.
*I conclude with what Justice Abu Said Choudhury, who later became the president of Bangladesh, had to say in a strongly worded letter dated December 16, 1971 that he addressed to Mrs Gandhi – warning her of dire consequences if she decided to go for a unilateral cease fire on the western front. It would remain, he maintained, the half-finished business of the Bangladesh war. His concluding line was, “When you chop off the tail of a cobra, its head becomes ten times more venomous.”
The letter arrived on the prime minister’s desk a day too late.Sashanka S. Banerjee was posted as a diplomat in the Indian mission in London in 1971-72. Among other books, he is the author of India, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh Liberation & Pakistan: A Political Treatise, published in the US in 2011. He was awarded a state honour, ‘Friend of Bangladesh Liberation War’ in October 2013 by Bangladesh Prime Minister Shaikh Hasina.
LAST WORD :
1. WE FAILED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE WAR WINS ON BOTH OCCASIONS ( 1965 AND 1971 ), AND DID NOT DICTATE OUR TERMS AND CONDITIONS, BECAUSE OF THE POOR INCOMPETENT POLITICAL CLASS;
2. AGAIN WE DID NOT GAIN THOUGH WE WON KARGIL WAR, AL THESE WERE THE OPPORTUNITIES WE LOST, BECAUSE OF THE POOR LEADERSHIP;
3. LORD KRISHNA GAVE US MANY CHANCES TO OVERCOME PAKISTAN EVIL INTENTIONS, SINCE 1947 KASHMIR INVASION BY PAK THEREAFTER 1965,1971, AND KARGIL WAR;
4. IF WE HAD ENOUGH GUTS KASHMIR PROBLEM SOLVED, BORDER PROBLEM SOLVED, PAKISTAN NEVER ATTEMPT ANY TERROR ACTIVITIES,;
5. TAKING THE LESSONS, NOW WE HAVE A CHANCE TO PIN DOWN PAKISTAN, KEEPING COOL, NOT INDULGING ANY CELEBRATIONS, CARRY THE BUSINESS AND DEFEAT PAKISTAN FOR EVER.
JAI HIND
JAI BHARATHAM
VANDE MATARAM
BHARAT MATA KI JAI
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